In this paper we use a structural VAR model with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility to investigate whether the Federal Reserve has responded systematically to asset prices and whether this response has changed over time. To recover the systematic component of monetary policy, we interpret the interest rate equation in the VAR as an extended monetary policy rule responding to infl ation, the output gap, house prices and stock prices. We fi nd some time variation in the coeffi cients for house prices and stock prices but fairly stable coeffi cients over time for infl ation and the output gap. Our results indicate that the systematic component of monetary policy in the US, i) attached a positive weight to real house price growth but lowered it prior to the crisis and eventually raised it again, and ii) only episodically took real stock price growth into account.
Introduction
The length and the severity of the Great Recession generated considerable interest in the evolution of US monetary policy over the period that preceded the recent economic slump. However, while the financial nature of the Great Recession revived the debate on whether monetary policy should respond directly to asset prices (cf. Borio Bernanke and Gertler (2000) , and Rigobon and Sack (2003) ) and the following extensions are all based on models with constant coefficients. Note that an alternative approach to using a TVP-SV-VAR is to estimate constant coefficient models for either rolling window samples or various sub-samples. However, the TVP-SV-VAR has the advantage of being more flexible as it jointly takes into account the information contained by all the variables in the full sample while at the same time explicitly modeling time variation in both the coefficients and the volatility. the response to stock prices was mild and episodic, the response to house prices was significant, from a statistical and economic point of view. We estimate the coefficient for house price growth to be about one third of the inflation coefficient in the policy rule.
Moreover, we identify non-negligible time variation in the coefficients. The coefficient on stock prices is higher around the end of the 1980s, thus capturing a marked response to the stock market crash of 1987, whereas it is relatively low and stable in the last part of the sample. The coefficient on house price inflation exhibits more pronounced swings: we identify a lower response around the mid 1990s and also in the Pre-Great Recession period.
Nevertheless, the coefficient is large, even in the pre-Great Recession period. Finally, the coefficients on inflation and the output gap and the interest rate smoothing term are relatively stable over time, with the partial exception of the mid 1990s.
While we do not find major evidence of time variation in the coefficients for inflation and the output gap, the use of a model with time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility turns out to be crucial for detecting the Fed's response to house price growth and to stock market returns. In fact, when we shut down time variation in the coefficients or stochastic volatility, the model does not find any response to house price growth.
Moreover, the response to stock prices is estimated to be not statistically significant in a model with constant coefficients. Therefore, we conclude that having a model with time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility is important in order to analyze our research question. Notably, the finding of a significant response to house prices is robust to changing the order of the variables in our VAR. This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we obviously complement previous studies on the monetary policy response to stock prices. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) estimate Taylor-type rules with a GMM methodology for the US and Japan and find evidence of a very small response, always statistically insignificant and in some cases even negative. Rigobon and Sack (2003) estimate a VAR identified through heteroskedasticity and conclude that the response of monetary policy to stock prices in the US was positive and significant over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . The same result emerges in Our main result is that the Fed responded to house prices and stock prices. While Castelnuovo and Nisticò (2010) , in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where monetary policy responds to fluctuations in the stock market, and in Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) , in a VAR identified using a combination of short-run and long-run restrictions. In contrast, a more recent literature argues that the Rigobon and Sack's finding is confined to specific periods (around the 1987 stock market crash in Furlanetto (2011) and more generally around recession periods in Ravn (2012)). While those results rely on various forms of sample splitting, they may highlight some instability in the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices, thus calling for the use of a model with time-varying coefficients.
Interestingly, while several papers study the response of monetary policy to stock prices, the response to house prices is largely unexplored. A noteworthy exception is Gali and Gambetti (2015) study the time-varying response of stock prices to monetary policy shocks. While our model is similar, we focus on the opposite relationship, i.e. the response of monetary policy to stock prices.
Finally, we also contribute to the debate on the monetary policy stance in the preGreat Recession period initiated by Taylor (2007 Taylor ( , 2009 ) who argues that the interest was kept too low for too long prior to the crisis. Belongia and Ireland (2016b) estimate a TVP-SV-VAR model with three variables (a measure of inflation, the interest rate and a measure of real economic activity) and find evidence of a lower response to inflation in estimation. Section 3 presents our results and a sensitivity analysis. Section 4 relates our results to the debate on the monetary policy stance in the pre-Great Recession period.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Econometric Model
To study how the Fed responded to asset prices in the pre-Great Recession period, we use the time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility VAR modelà la Primiceri (2005) 1 and Cogley and Sargent (2005) with the reduced form representation
where x t is a n × 1 vector of endogenous variables, c t is a n × 1 vector of time-varying coefficients that multiply constant terms, B i,t , i = 1, ..., p are n × n matrices of timevarying coefficients and u t ∼ MV N(0, Ω t ), where A t Ω t A t = Σ t Σ t , with Σ t diagonal and A t , the contemporaneous (time-varying) coefficients matrix, lower triangular. In stacked form, the model is equal to:
The time-varying parameters evolve according to B t = B t−1 + ν t , α t = α t−1 + ζ t , log σ t = log σ t−1 +η t 2 . It is assumed that the innovations in the model are jointly normally distributed with the following variance-covariance matrix:
1 We follow the updated MCMC procedures suggested by Del Negro and Primiceri (2015). They retain most of the procedures in Primiceri (2005) except that sampling of stochastic volatilities is preceded by sampling of states for mixture component approximations to errors with log chi-square distributions.
2 To check the validity of these assumptions we run a rolling window constant parameter VAR model. We find random-walk behaviour in the first difference of the coefficients, a result which substantiates the assumptions. recent years, thus supporting the Taylor evidence. Our model can be seen as an extension of their model to include asset prices in the analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and the details of the
As a first pass, the structural representation is recovered via a recursive identification scheme. This identification strategy follows the seminal contributions by Christiano et al. (1999) 
The total number of Gibbs sampling iterations is set to 150,000 with a burn-in of 100,000 draws and convergence is checked by means of rolling variances plots. We keep the remaining 50,000 draws and use every 100th for inference. The results are basically identical if, more conservatively, we kept every 20th draw instead. In that case, if anything, we find that the coefficient on S&P 500 growth is significant with a magnitude of 0.02 not only around the 1987 financial crisis but also in 2007:Q3, i.e., prior to the onset of the Great Recession. Also, results are unaffected if we do or we do not truncate the autoregressive matrices to yield stationary draws. In all exercises, the number of stationary draws is always above 2/3. the prior variance of log σ t to 4I n instead of I n . With these choices of hyperparameters, the priors are diffuse and uninformative and, in fact, the prior for the stochastic volatility of the model described in (2.8) is de facto flat. This choice of priors is conservative for the question we address in the sense that it does not restrict the amount of potential time variation in the volatility of the model and, thus, does not artificially blow up the time variation in the policy coefficients.
We consider quarterly data from 1975:Q2 to 2008:Q4. In particular, the vector The systematic component of monetary policy is recovered from the structural representation of our model
or, equivalently, and omitting constant terms ⎡ 
Looking at the fifth row of (2.11), we have 
Results
In this section we present estimates for the time-varying coefficients on real house price and real stock price growth as well as for the coefficients on the standard objectives of monetary policy in the context of our baseline model. Later on we perform sensitivity analysis to discuss issues related to simultaneity and to the importance of time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility for our results.
The coefficients are reported along with the 16%-84% credibility intervals for the period ranging from 1985:Q3 to 2008:Q4 since we discard the observations used in the training sample to set up the priors.
We will focus on the time evolution of the sum of the coefficients on the contempora- 
Baseline Estimation
The coefficient on the lagged interest rate finds a counterpart in the interest rate smoothing term in a Taylor In the mid panel in Figure 1 we plot time-varying estimates for the sum of coefficients on current and lagged core PCE inflation and output gap. When compared with Taylor rule coefficients, our estimates appear to be particularly small. The coefficients generally considered standard in a Taylor (1993) rule are higher than 1.5 for the term on inflation and between 0.5 and 1 for the term on the output gap. However, those numbers ignore the role of the interest rate smoothing coefficient. To give some purely illustrative guidance on how to interpret our estimated coefficients, consider as an example the following Taylortype rule with constant coefficients featuring interest rate smoothing: The coefficients are fairly stable over time, with evidence of a gradual decrease and subsequent increase in the inflation coefficient from early 1992 to late 1998. The output coefficient features the inverse pattern and thus (partially) compensates for the decline in the inflation coefficient. While we find some time variation during the 1990s, the evidence for the 2000s favors more stable coefficients. Nevertheless, we find a smaller response to inflation and higher response to the output gap during the pre-Great Recession period.
We will discuss further the implications of our results for the debate over the stance of monetary policy in the pre-Great Recession period in Section 4.
While our results on the response to stock prices are in line with the previous literature, even though the methodology is different, we uncover some new findings when we investigate the response to real house price growth, which we plot in the bottom panel of We believe that our results on the Fed's conduct are open to different interpretations.
On the one hand, we find that the Fed has on average responded to fluctuations in house prices and that this response has on average been quantitatively important. On the other hand, the response declined somewhat sharply precisely in the period when house prices were growing most, i.e. the pre-Great Recession period.
Next, we answer the main questions of interest to this paper, namely i) whether the While the focus of our paper is the systematic component of monetary policy, an interesting by-product of our analysis is the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
In order to obtain the impulse responses for the data in terms of levels, we apply the standard practice of cumulating the impulse responses over horizons at each point in time. The magnitude of the impulse responses can thus be interpreted as a percentage reviewed in Williams (2015) . This is not so surprising, however, since in our model the systematic response of monetary policy largely undoes the direct effect of a monetary policy shock on house prices. We conclude that, according to our model, monetary policy surprises are not effective in curbing house prices.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform robustness checks on the estimates for the systematic response of monetary policy to house prices and stock prices.
In the first exercise we change the ordering of the variables in the econometric model.
In our baseline we have restricted the impact response of house prices and stock prices to a monetary policy shock since our main focus is on the response of monetary policy to financial variables. Here, we change the vector In a second exercise we use the order Our model with house prices and stock prices confirms some limited changes in the systematic component of monetary policy. We find evidence of a slightly lower response to inflation (but not to the output gap) in the pre-Great Recession period. Moreover, we also find a decline in the response to house prices that points to a less aggressive reaction of monetary policy to economic conditions. However, we find only relatively small changes in the non-systematic component of monetary policy. More specifically, we consider the fitted interest rate implied by our model: 
Debate on the Evolution of US Monetary Policy
In this section we discuss the evolution of US monetary policy in the pre-Great Recession period. In particular, we contribute to the debate between Taylor (2007 Taylor ( , 2009 ) and Bernanke (2015) through the lenses of our model that includes house prices and stock prices.
In recent years, Taylor argued that the FOMC policy has been "too low for too long" compared to the interest rate path prescribed by his rule (Taylor (2007 (Taylor ( , 2009 ). Bernanke (2015) shows that when using i) real-time data, ii) a modified Taylor rule with a coefficient of 1 for the output gap and iii) PCE inflation instead of GDP inflation, the "Great Deviation" pointed out by Taylor does not emerge.
Belongia and Ireland (2016b) estimate a three variable TVP-SV-VAR model and find
The top panel of Figure 7 shows that the implied VAR interest rate fits well with the actual interest rate movements. We find some expansionary monetary policy shocks during the period 2003-2004, but we do not detect a "Great Deviation" from the historical rule.
In Figure 6 we Overall, we confirm previous results in Belongia and Ireland (2016b), as we identify a shift in Federal Reserve policy away from inflation and house price inflation stabilization and some departures from rule-like behavior. However, our reading of the results is that these changes are quantitatively small and that this evidence is not sufficient to conclude that the interest rate was too low for too long. Bringing these insights into models with TVP-SV-VAR seems an interesting avenue for future research.
To sum up, in the case of both real-time data and ex-post data, we do not find evidence of a "Great Deviation" from the path prescribed by the systematic component estimated by our model, in line with Bernanke's arguments.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the time-varying response of monetary policy to stock prices and house prices. We find that the response to stock price fluctuations has been small and episodic, in keeping with the previous literature.
Our main result is that we find a significant response to house prices, both in economic and statistical terms. While the response to house prices declines somewhat in the preGreat Recession period, our evidence shows that the Fed considers variables other than inflation and real economic activity in its estimated reaction function. Our analysis has no normative implications for whether such a response to asset prices (and house prices in particular) was optimal, insufficient or excessive. Nevertheless, we believe it is interesting to document that it was substantial.
One direction for future research is to further take into account the simultaneity in the 
